The Microsoft Era is over

MIT Technology Review: “In 2009 Microsoft’s software was on 90%of all computing devices (PCs, phones, tablets). Today, only on 23% of devices sold”.

It happened without them noticing, but Microsoft lost its empire overnight. Mobile, consumerization of IT and Cloud apps are to blame.

Tiered Virtualization Approach - Maintain critical on VMware, grow non-critical on Hyper-V. Is this a real trend?

If so, virtualization management stacks surely seem to have a place in the market.

irq:

(via Hotlink SuperVISOR - vCenter for Hyper-V, KVM, and XenServer | The Virtualization Practice)

Tiered Virtualization Approach - Maintain critical on VMware, grow non-critical on Hyper-V. Is this a real trend?

If so, virtualization management stacks surely seem to have a place in the market.

irq:

(via Hotlink SuperVISOR - vCenter for Hyper-V, KVM, and XenServer | The Virtualization Practice)

"R&D expenditures on a stand-alone basis, in absolute or relative terms, do not correlate with disruptive growth. Essentially, you cannot buy innovation."

Horace Dediu, always data in hand, always spot-on.

(Source: asymco.com)

When the Metro arrives late.

It is a common perception that the right time-to-market is crucial for a product or service. Microsoft has a history of painful experiences with regards to this; Vista, Zune, Kin, Xbox, Bing. All examples of a very late arrival that hindered adoption and/or profitability.

This time, though, it may be actually good for Microsoft to be late to the party. Their recent Windows 8 preview, based on their “Metro” interface, has been well received as a new, fresh approach to post-PC platforms. Sure, there are lots of questionable choices like their apparent inability to leave the Desktop metaphore behind, but still it feels like there may be something here. Which in itself is a feat for a company recently known more for its disconnect from the user than for innovation.

Why is it that, of all, Microsoft has been the one to breath fresh air into the touch space?

Well, for once, Microsoft did not rush to copycat its competors, and left that role for Google, HP, RIM and others, who rushed into embarrasing themselves with shameless imitations of Apple’s enormously successful iOS. By the time the Redmond guys arrived at the party someone else had taken the “me too” seat, so for once they were forced to wait and watch everyone else fail in their effort to succeed with their platforms. And boy did they learn from that.

It may have been strategic planning. It may well have been utter inability. But the fact is that, by being so late, Microsoft are actually early to the second round of the game, where they have had the chance to watch from the sideline, learn from others’ mistakes, and delive something unique.

Metro might not be yet finalized, and there is more than a year still ahead of us before its release to the public, but as of today it already represents the most interesting and promising alternative to Apple’s dominance in the tablet space. There is still time for Microsoft to screw up this one too, so let’s be cautious.

It is looking good for Metro for the moment, and Microsoft got this chance by being late, so terribly late.

"How will Windows developers react to the restrictive Metro environment after being able to do almost whatever they wanted for nearly two decades?"

Marco Arment.

(Source: marco.org)

Another Fun Data Point

parislemon:

When Apple’s market cap hits $400 billion, they’ll be worth more than Microsoft and Google — combined

They’re now less than $20 billion away from that happening. 

The costs of the patent Cold War

Imagine what could be achieved with a free 12 billion dollars. What could technology giants such as Google, Microsoft or Apple surprise us with? In which fantastic ways would innovation materialize into revolutionary products?

Now imagine that all that potential got lost in a fruitless patent guerrilla. That’s today.

Google acquired Motorola Mobility on August 12th, for the astonishing sum of 12.5 billion dollars. That means duplicating its workforce with another 19,000 employees, and completing its largest acquisition ever. This was not a strategic move. This was a tactical, defensive operation that cost Google in excess of a net 7 billion dollars, when you discount Motorola’s cash and assets. Its ultimate goal: get hold of a patent arsenal to defend itself from competitors.

Some weeks ago, a consortium including Apple, Microsoft and RIM spent over 4.5 billion dollars in the defunct Nortel’s patent portfolio. This is surely what motivated Google’s quick and bold response. And the madness goes on and on.

These last moves are surprising for several reasons:

  • The mean cost per patent has rocketed to over $500,000 each in these acquisitions. Half-a-million-dollars for one-single-patent.
  • Neither of these investments provide any innovation value whatsoever to its investors. This is 100% insurance money… just in case.
  • Patents have become an asset that’s valued not so much for what it enables you to do, but for what it forbids others from doing.

Patents exist to foster innovation, as The Economist pointed out yesterday, “granting an inventor a limited monopoly over a technology in return for disclosing the details of its workings, so that others can build upon the invention”. One could argue that their use has been corrupted lately, and the costs of the current patent system are damaging, more than helping, innovators. Even worse:

“Patents are emerging as a new currency,” Alexander I. Poltorak, chief executive of the patent licensing and enforcement firm General Patent, told the New York Times. “I’ve recently received several calls from financial analysts and bankers who want to know how to value patents and what does it mean.”

Akin to the Cold War arms race, gigantic amounts of money are being spent in a dissuasive campaign to protect from patent lawsuits. And indeed these amounts are gigantic: to put just these two initial examples into perspective, what Google spent in the Motorola acquisition is somewhat comparable to the cost of developing the Large Hadron Collider, arguably the single greatest and most ambitious experiment the human being has ever pursued. But, unlike the Cold War, this time the industry faces a new enemy: patent trolls.

The purpose of a dissuasive weapon is to prevent opponents from using their own similar weapons, out of fear that they would receive the same damage upon themselves. But patent trolls do not have any product to defend against lawsuits. They have no “population” to protect, and no “cities” that could be attacked. They can just use their patents again and again without fear of retaliation, making millions of dollars every time. These are patent monsters, direct result of how the patent system works:

It is far too easy to be granted a far too vague patent over far too many things these days.

The pharmaceutical and medical industries went over a similar process in the past, and are now stuck in a place where over $50bn a year is spent in “defensive medicine” to protect from medical malpractice lawsuits, or more money is spent in patent litigation than in actual investigation for new prescription drugs. Another study showed that in 1999:

American public companies’ total profits from patents (excluding pharmaceuticals) in 1999 were about $4 billion—but that the associated litigation costs were $14 billion.

There is a great danger that the tech industry could follow next.

Meanwhile, the results of this situation today, are:

There is a continuous value-destruction process going on around the patent warfare. And this is happening while the debt-crisis and stagnant economy challenge our very way of life and the European welfare state. Technology is a strategic asset for value creation, productivity improvements and industry transformation, all three much needed to reverse the current economic downturn.

Fix this mess, or we won’t be able to deal with it later.

What’s the point, Nokia?

Stephen Elop unveiled Nokia’s first Windows Phone device some days ago. It’s not the N9, but almost. It’s Nokia’s first product that embraces Microsoft’s platform. It looks cool, as Mango does indeed show some promise, and it is consistent with the tactical position Nokia has taken. But I still think this is not a very strategic move.

And I’m not alone wondering what is the point of it all. Just see what Horace Dediu compiled about the fate of previous MS mobile partners. Including the very Nokia, back in 2009:

”The worldwide leader in software and the world’s largest smartphone manufacturer have entered into an alliance that is set to deliver a groundbreaking, enterprise-grade solution for mobile productivity. Today, Microsoft Business Division President Stephen Elop and Nokia’s Executive Vice President for Devices Kai Öistämö announced the agreement, outlining a shared vision for the future of mobile productivity. This is the first time that either company has embarked on an alliance of this scope and nature.”

Two years later, Stephen Elop is now the head of Nokia,  Symbian looks more like Zombian after its deprecation, and it will be hard not to remeber what happened to Sendo, Ericsson, Verizon, Nortel, Palm, Motorola and LG after they partnered with Microsoft.